

# Hawks, Doves and Opportunistic Opposition Parties

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## Overview

This document provides analyses briefly discussed—but not presented—in “Hawks, Doves and Opportunistic Opposition Parties.” All of the substantive effects of models are calculated with the *Average Scenario* described in the manuscript.

## Descriptive Statistics

Figure S.1 shows the distribution of values for *government partisanship*. Table S.2 shows the distribution of NCMs across *government partisanship* (values less than 0 are considered left), and *partisanship*. Left and center/right-wing opposition parties use NCMs about equally overall (50 compared to 53), but they are much more likely to challenge governments far away from them ideologically.

[Figure S.1 and Table S.2 about here]

## Summary Statistics

I provide the summary statistics for the variables in Table S.1.

[Table S.1 about here]

## Marginal Effects of Disputes

Since *hostile disputes*, *partisanship*, and *government partisanship* are included in the models interactively, there are more inferences available than simply those presented in the manuscript. For

example, one can examine the change in predicted probability of an NCM in the presence of a hostile dispute compared to the absence of a hostile dispute.

[Figure S.2 about here]

Figure S.2 shows the first difference in predicted probability of an NCM across *partisanship* for a hostile dispute compared to no hostile dispute. Following a hostile interstate dispute, far-left opposition parties become less likely to propose NCMs while moderate and far-right opposition parties become more likely to propose NCMs. This is consistent with the *issue ownership hypothesis*.

[Figure S.3 about here]

Figure S.3 shows the change in predicted probability of a center/right opposition party (top panel) and a left opposition party (bottom panel) proposing a NCM following a hostile dispute compared to no hostile dispute. A hostile dispute makes center/right opposition parties statistically more likely to propose a NCM when faced with moderate to far-left government parties (top panel). On the other hand, a hostile dispute makes left opposition parties statistically less likely to propose a NCM when faced with moderate to far-left government. The first difference becomes positive when facing far-right governments, but this increase is far from being statistically significant. Overall, Figures S.2-S.3 lend additional support to the *issue ownership hypothesis*.

## All Disputes

I originally estimated the models to predict how opposition parties respond to *hostile* disputes, with the expectation that parties may be less likely to respond similarly for lower-level disputes. Public opinion data suggests that the public's awareness of the government's participation in a crisis, as well as the salience of foreign policy, increases with the hostility of the event (see Schultz 2001: 73-76 for a review). Nevertheless, opposition parties may still challenge governments for lower-level disputes if their motivations include publicizing the event and elevating it on voters' agendas. In Table S.3 I replicate the three models from the manuscript but with a count of *all MID*s in that government/quarter.

[Table S.3 about here]

Model 5 indicates that the farther to the right an opposition party is, the more likely they will challenge the government (this increase is statistically significant). Model 6 provides additional support for the *issue ownership hypothesis*: center/right opposition parties become statistically less likely to challenge right-wing governments, and left-wing governments are statistically more likely to be challenged by right-wing opposition parties than left-wing parties (significant at the 90% confidence level). The results are robust to these changes, indicating that opposition parties are motivated in a distinctly partisan manner by electoral concerns to respond to all disputes, even if they are simply threats or displays of force.

## Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)

If opposition parties respond to particularly salient events, then those disputes that produce fatalities may elicit stronger responses. To test this possibility, I provide the three models in Table S.4. Since a lack of variation makes it impossible to estimate the three-way interaction in Model 3, I provide separate tests of the two interactive relationships: *Fatal MIDs* × *Partisanship* (Model 8) and *Fatal MIDs* × *Government Partisanship* (Model 9). While this cannot address the possible three-way conditional relationship shown in Model 3 of the manuscript, we can make two inferences: first, how the opposition's partisanship conditions whether it responds to fatal MIDs by proposing NCMs, and second, whether the government's partisanship makes it more or less vulnerable to NCMs following fatal MIDs.

[Table S.4 about here]

Similar to Model 1 in the manuscript, Model 7 in Table S.4 shows that there is no additive effect of *Fatal MIDs* on the occurrence of NCMs.

[Figures S.4 and S.5 about here]

On the other hand, there is additional evidence supporting the manuscript's findings, since Figure S.4 shows that the probability of an opposition party proposing an NCM in response to a fatal dispute increases substantially as the party shifts to the right. In Figure S.5 I show the marginal effect of a *Fatal MID* on the probability of an NCM across the values of *Government Partisanship*. The expectation is that this marginal effect will be highest for far-left governments and decrease as the government shifts rightward. Indeed, the probability of proposing an NCM is highest and positive for far-left governments (nearly significant at the 90% confidence level), and this probability decreases until the marginal effect becomes statistically significant (at the 90% confidence level) when *Government Partisanship* exceeds about 45. Thus, although the rarity of fatal disputes in the sample prevented a complete analysis, preliminary evidence suggests opposition parties respond similarly to these more violent events.

## Controlling for Dispute Duration

One possibility is that longer disputes will be more likely to be met with NCMs since they provide the opposition with greater opportunities to voice their displeasure. To control for this possibility, I add a variable called *dispute duration* to the three models which counts the number of quarters that the dispute has been ongoing.

[Table S.5 about here]

The coefficient for *hostile MID*s in Model 10 (Table S.5) is not statistically significant. In Model 11 (Table S.5) I interact *hostile MID*s with *partisanship*, and Figure S.6 shows the predicted probability (with 90% confidence intervals) of an NCM across the range of opposition party ideology.

[Figure S.6 about here]

The results echo those found in the manuscript: right-wing opposition parties become statistically more likely to challenge governments following hostile disputes than left-wing opposition parties.<sup>1</sup>

In Model 12 (Table S.5) I estimate the three-way interactive model. I plot the predicted probability of an NCM for a left-wing opposition party and a center/right-wing opposition party across the entire range of *government partisanship*.

[Figure S.7 about here]

The probability of a center/right-wing opposition party challenging the government increases as the government shifts to the left; likewise, the probability of a left-wing opposition party challenging the government increases as the government shifts to the left. Most importantly, there is a statistical difference in the probability of a center/right and left-wing opposition party challenging a left-wing government following a hostile dispute. Thus, there is substantial evidence in favor of the conclusions reached in the manuscript. Moreover, since the coefficient for *dispute duration* never reaches conventional levels of statistical significance I can conclude that the length of the dispute does not have an effect on the behavior of the opposition parties.

## Relative Belligerence of the Government During the Dispute

I created a measure that captures the state's relative belligerence, which might influence how opposition parties respond to conflict. I create the variable *timid*, which is coded 1 if the democracy reached a lower level of hostility than the opponent (according to the *hostlev* variable in the Militarized Interstate Dispute 3.0 data set).<sup>2</sup> In Table S.6 I show two models with one three-way interaction: *hostile MID*s  $\times$  *government partisanship*  $\times$  *timid*.

[Table S.6 about here]

Rather than including a complex four-way interaction I divide the sample into left- and center/right-wing opposition parties (Models 13 and 14, respectively). Figure S.8 shows how center/right-wing (top panel) and left-wing (bottom panel) opposition parties, respectively, respond to hostile versus timid behavior across the range of *government partisanship*.

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<sup>1</sup>The probability of an NCM is statistically lower when *partisanship* is -50 than when *partisanship* is 20 or greater. Moreover, the probability of an NCM when *partisanship* is +50 is statistically higher than the probability when *partisanship* is less than about -10.

<sup>2</sup>For example, if the hostility level of the democracy was coded as a 4 (use of force) and the opponent's hostility level was coded as a 5 (war), then the dispute would be coded as "timid".

[Figure S.8 about here]

The top panel of Figure S.8 provides us with three inferences for center/right-wing opposition parties. First, following a MID where the government engaged in relatively hostile behavior, the probability of a center/right opposition party proposing an NCM does not change statistically over the range of *government partisanship*. As long as the government engaged in relatively hostile behavior, all types of governments—extreme-right, centrist, extreme-left—face the same statistical risk of being challenged by the right-wing opposition. Second, if the state was timid in its behavior during the hostile dispute, then the government’s partisanship matters. The predicted probability of an NCM increases substantially for far-left governments.<sup>3</sup> Finally, the probability of a right-wing opposition party challenging a left-wing government is statistically higher if the government engaged in timid rather than hostile behavior.<sup>4</sup>

The bottom panel of Figure S.8 depicts the similar relationship but for left-wing opposition parties. First, left-wing opposition parties become more likely to challenge governments as *government partisanship* shifts to the right, for both the timid and the hostile scenario.<sup>5</sup> The second inference suggests that left-wing opposition parties do not consider the relative belligerence of the government when deciding whether or not to challenge the government. There is not a statistical difference in the predicted probability of an NCM for the scenarios across any value of *government partisanship*.

## Electoral Consequences of Security-Based NCMs

In the *Discussion and Conclusion* section I note the following implication: “By demonstrating that left-wing governments are more vulnerable to NCMs following conflict than right-wing governments, I can conclude that right-wing opposition parties expect an electoral benefit from proposing in that situation. My extension of the issue ownership theory suggests that proposing NCMs in a policy area where the opposition party is considered competent will provide long-term benefits”.

To provide a basic test of this empirical implication, I create a data set containing vote share data on all parties—both opposition and government. Following the literature on economic voting (e.g., Powell and Whitten 1993), I estimate a model predicting the change in vote share from election  $t - 1$  to election  $t$  (*vote change<sub>t</sub>*), controlling for the previous vote share (*vote share<sub>t-1</sub>*), state of the economy (*real GDP per capita growth*), the number of hostile disputes in the 12 months prior to the election (*hostile MIDs*), the government parties’ weighted left-right score (*government partisanship*), and whether the opposition party is on the left or center/right (*partisanship*).<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>The predicted probability of an NCM when *government partisanship* is -50 is statistically higher than the probability when *government partisanship* is -25 and to the right.

<sup>4</sup>The probability of an NCM is statistically higher for the timid than the hostile scenario when *government partisanship* is greater than -30.

<sup>5</sup>The predicted probabilities become statistically higher than the predicted probability when *government partisanship* = -50 at 0 (for the timid scenario) and 10 (for the hostile scenario).

<sup>6</sup>Electoral results and partisanship data are from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Klingemann et al. 2006), government composition data are from Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000), data on disputes are from the Correlates

The key theoretical variable for these models is the occurrence of an NCM that directly challenges the government on the issues that right-wing parties “own”: national security, foreign policy, and military-related issues. I create a new variable called *security NCMs*, which counts the number of foreign policy, national security or military-related NCMs in the 12 months prior to the election. Since I have expectations for both government and opposition parties I divide the sample based on whether the party was in government (i.e., whether it controlled a cabinet portfolio according to Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 2000). Model 15 tests whether the government’s partisanship conditions the impact of *security NCMs* on government parties’ vote shares. Model 16 tests the electoral consequences for opposition parties with a three-way interaction of *security NCMs*, *government partisanship* and *partisanship*.

[Table S.7 about here]

The coefficient for *security NCMs*×*government partisanship* is statistically significant and in the expected direction.

[Figures S.9 and S.10 about here]

Figure S.9 shows the marginal effect of *security NCM* across the range of *government partisanship*. As expected, left-wing government parties tend to lose votes following these security-based NCMs, even when I control for the presence of *hostile MIDs*. Right-wing government parties are unharmed, and in fact, far-right parties might actually benefit from being challenged on these issues. This suggests that opposition parties may want to refrain from challenging right-wing governments in these situations because they may certainly backfire.

In Model 16 I examine the electoral consequences for opposition parties. Figure S.10 shows how the marginal effect of *security NCM* varies for left and center/right-wing opposition parties across the range of *government partisanship*. The first inference is that both left and center/right opposition parties lose votes when they challenge right-wing governments. The difference, however, is that center/right-wing opposition parties stand to gain a substantial amount when they challenge left-wing governments while the best that left-wing opposition parties can do is to not lose additional votes (i.e., when *government partisanship* = about -30). These are particularly interesting results in that they highlight why right-wing opposition parties are more shielded from these types of challenges, and because it shows the varying incentives that opposition parties have to challenge government.

## Excluding Semi-Presidential Regimes

The sample in the manuscript includes advanced European democracies where the government is responsible to the parliament. While France certainly fits these criteria, it is an interesting anomaly

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of War data set (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004), and the Penn World Table provides GDP data (Heston, Summers and Aten 2006).

because a successful NCM in France would not remove the executive (i.e., president) in charge of foreign policy. On the other hand, a successful NCM would remove the government (and prime minister), thus forcing the dissolution of parliament and early elections. Since these elections are not concurrent with presidential elections, a successful NCM (and early general elections) would raise the possibility of cohabitation, which is where the president and prime minister are from different party coalitions. Though the president is still likely to have relative autonomy in foreign policy making, “cohabitation has demonstrated that the president’s exclusive authority depends on commanding a majority in the National Assembly” (Lewis-Beck 1997: 316). While an NCM would not threaten the president’s tenure, it could potentially make life more difficult for him in other policy areas.

Nevertheless, it is perhaps instructive to see if France’s unique institutional variation influences the empirical results. In Table S.8 I estimate the three models on a sample that excludes France.

[Table S.8 about here]

Unlike Model 1 in the manuscript, Model 17 (Table S.8) shows some preliminary support for the unconditional impact of hostile disputes on the probability of an NCM. The coefficient for *hostile MIDs* is positive and close to being statistically significant (at the 90% confidence level), which indicates that, once I exclude France, being involved in hostile disputes increases the probability of being challenged. Of course, theoretically I expect that this effect is conditioned by the partisanship of both the opposition parties and the government.

The coefficient for *hostile MIDs* × *partisanship* (Model 18) is statistically significant and in the expected direction. Figure S.11 shows that the predicted probability of an NCM increases as the opposition party shifts to the right.<sup>7</sup> In Model 19 I show the three-way interaction between *hostile MIDs*, *partisanship*, and *government partisanship* and the predicted probability of an NCM is depicted in Figure S.12.

[Figures S.11 and S.12 about here]

Similar to the results found in the manuscript, Figure S.11 shows that the probability of proposing an NCM increases as the *partisanship* increases. Moreover, Figure S.12 shows that the probability of proposing an NCM increases for center/right-wing opposition parties as the government shifts to the left, and increases for left-wing opposition parties as the government shifts to the right. Most importantly, left-wing governments face a statistically higher probability of being challenged following a hostile dispute by the center/right opposition than the left-wing opposition. These results provide further support for the results found in the manuscript, and suggest that France’s inclusion in the sample has little influence on the overall findings.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Indeed, the predicted probability of an NCM is statistically lower when *partisanship* = -50 than when *partisanship* is 10 or higher.

<sup>8</sup>We can compare the equality of the coefficients across samples (i.e., one including France compared to one excluding France) with a seemingly unrelated logit model. For Model 18, the marginal effect of a *hostile MID* across

## Initiators versus Targets

One might expect that opposition parties would be more reluctant to propose NCMs following instances where the government was targeted—as opposed to initiated—in a dispute. Initiating a dispute may be seen by the public as a relatively unnecessary “war of choice”, whereas being targeted in a dispute may absolve the government from its participation. To test this possibility, I replicate Models 1-3 with the exception that I count the number of hostile MIDs that were initiated by the democracy (*initiated hostile MIDs* in Models 20-22) and the number of hostile MIDs that were targeted at the democracy (*targeted hostile MIDs* in Models 23-25). These are shown in Tables S.9 and S.10.

[Tables S.9 and S.10 about here]

The first inference is that neither initiating nor being targeted in a hostile MID produces a statistically significant increase in the probability of an NCM (as shown in Models 21 and 24). Consistent with the results in the manuscript, the effects of disputes are conditional on the government and opposition party’s partisanship.

In Models 21 and 24 I interact the measures of *hostile MIDs* (initiators and targets, respectively) with *partisanship*. The two panels of Figure S.13 show that the probability of responding to a hostile dispute increases similarly as *partisanship* shifts to the right for both initiators and targets.<sup>9</sup> Though the confidence intervals are considerably wider for being a target of a hostile dispute, the slopes appear to be similar across the two models. In fact, there is no statistical difference in the predicted probability across the two models at any value of *partisanship*. More importantly, the only instance where the predicted probability of an NCM is statistically different in Model 2 compared to either the initiators (Model 21) or targets model (Model 24) is when *partisanship* is greater than 30. In those cases, there is a statistically higher probability of proposing an NCM following an initiated hostile dispute than all hostile disputes.

[Figures S.13 and S.14 about here]

I present the three-way interactions in Models 22 and 25 and the two panels of Figure S.14 compare the predicted probability of an NCM for initiators versus targets of hostile disputes. Following both types of disputes, left-wing opposition parties become more likely to challenge as *partisanship* increases, and center/right-wing opposition parties become more likely to challenge as *partisanship* decreases. Moreover, for both types of disputes, left-wing governments are statistically more likely to be challenged by center/right-wing opposition parties than left-wing opposition parties. Though the probability of an NCM following a targeted hostile dispute at times appears to

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*partisanship* is not statistically different across samples. Furthermore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effect of *hostile MID* across *government partisanship* is statistically different across samples for either the left-wing opposition or center/right-wing opposition scenarios (Model 19).

<sup>9</sup>Following the initiation of a hostile dispute, the probability of an NCM when *partisanship* = -50 is statistically lower than the probability when *partisanship* is 10 or greater.

be larger than that of an initiated hostile dispute, there is no statistical difference in how right-wing opposition parties respond to initiated or targeted hostile disputes. Left-wing opposition parties, on the other hand, become statistically more likely to challenge following initiated disputes than hostile disputes, but only for a short range of values of *partisanship* (-20 to +10). Overall, these results suggest that opposition parties respond broadly similarly to all types of hostile disputes.

## Cold War versus Post-Cold War

Another possibility is that different types of conflicts may warrant different responses by opposition parties. The public (and, in response, opposition parties) may respond differently to conflicts based on “wars of necessity” versus “wars of choice” (Haass 2009). This is consistent with evidence that the American public is more supportive of uses of force to resist aggression rather than produce domestic political change (e.g., Jentleson 1992; Oneal, Lian and Joyner 1996). Since no scholars, to my knowledge, have coded hostile disputes based on “principal policy objective”, there is no direct test of this hypothesis. One way to approximate the different types of conflict is to divide the sample into the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. I can then assess whether the interactive relationships between *hostile MID*s, *partisanship* and *government partisanship* is statistically different across eras.

In Tables S.11 and S.12 I replicate Models 1-3 for the Cold War (Models 26-28) and the post-Cold War (Models 29-31) eras.

[Tables S.11 and S.12 about here]

At first glance, there appear to be some interesting differences between the two time periods. For example, the additive coefficient for *hostile MID*s is statistically significant (and in the expected direction) in the post-Cold War model. Though it is not statistically significant in the Cold War model, the appropriate inference is not to see whether the *level* of statistical significance varies across models but instead to see whether the *effects* are statistically different. In this case, there is no statistical difference between the effects of *hostile MID*s in the Cold War versus post-Cold War era ( $\chi^2=0.60$ , p-value=0.44).

Figure S.15 shows that, while the slope is flatter and the confidence interval is wider in the Cold War model, there is little difference between the effects of *hostile MID*s across eras.

[Figure S.15 about here]

Indeed, using seemingly unrelated logit models, I produce joint significance tests that test whether the marginal effect of *hostile MID*s across *partisanship* is statistically different across the two eras. Since the p-value for this test never approaches 0.1, I am confident that there is no statistical difference in this relationship across eras.

We can make similar inferences for Model 3 across sub-samples with Figure S.16.

[Figure S.16 about here]

By producing joint significance tests of the marginal effects across sub-samples (similar to those described above), I can conclude that there is no statistical difference in the marginal effect of *hostile MID* across *government partisanship* for center/right-wing opposition parties across the two time periods. The marginal effects for left-wing opposition parties are indistinguishable except for values of *government partisanship* greater than about 20. When facing moderate- to far-right wing governments, left-wing opposition parties are statistically more likely to respond to hostile disputes with NCMs in the post-Cold War era than the Cold War era. This provides some support for the idea that patterns of conflict in the post-Cold War era may induce different types of behavior by opposition parties, though it appears that these differences occur in somewhat unique circumstances.

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# Tables & Figures

Figure S.1: Distribution of Values of Government Partisanship




Figure S.2: Change in Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following a Hostile International Conflict Compared to No Conflict






Figure S.3: Change in Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict Compared to No Conflict for Left- and Center/Right-Wing Opposition Parties across the Range of Government Partisanship



(a) Center/Right Opposition



(b) Left Opposition

Figure S.4: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following a Fatal International Conflict across the Range of Opposition Party Partisanship (Model 8)




Figure S.5: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following a Fatal International Conflict across the Range of Government Partisanship (Model 9)




Figure S.6: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict across the Range of Opposition Party Partisanship: Controlling for Dispute Duration (Model 11)




Figure S.7: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict for Left- and Center/Right-Wing Opposition Parties across the Range of Government Partisanship: Controlling for Dispute Duration (Model 12)






Figure S.8: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict for Left- and Center/Right-Wing Opposition Parties across the Range of Government Partisanship: Relative Belligerence (Models 13-14)



(a) Center/Right Opposition



(b) Left Opposition

Figure S.9: Marginal Effect of a Security NCM on Change in Government Parties' Vote Shares across the Range of Government Partisanship (Model 15)






Figure S.10: Marginal Effect of a Security NCM on Change in Opposition Parties' Vote Shares across the Range of Government Partisanship (Model 16)



(a) Left Opposition



(b) Center/Right Opposition

Figure S.11: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict across the Range of Opposition Party Partisanship: Excluding France (Model 18)




Figure S.12: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict for Left- and Center/Right-Wing Opposition Parties across the Range of Government Partisanship: Excluding France (Model 19)






Figure S.13: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict across the Range of Opposition Party Partisanship (Models 21 and 24)




(a) Initiators




(b) Targets

Figure S.14: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict for Left- and Center/Right-Wing Opposition Parties across the Range of Opposition Party Partisanship (Models 22 and 25)




(a) Initiators




(b) Targets

Figure S.15: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict for across the Range of Opposition Party Partisanship (Models 27 and 30)




(a) Cold War




(b) Post-Cold War

Figure S.16: Predicted Probability of a No-Confidence Motion Following International Conflict for Left- and Center/Right-Wing Opposition Parties across the Range of Opposition Party Partisanship (Models 28 and 31)



(a) Cold War



(b) Post-Cold War

Table S.1: Summary Statistics

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min.</b>	<b>Max.</b>	<b>Mode</b>
Hostile MIDs	0.17	0.41	0	3	0
Left Party	0.45	0.50	0	1	0
Government Partisanship	2.01	19.0	-41.2	61.07	
Partisanship	-4.95	21.94	-59.9	70.3	
Party Size	0.11	0.12	0.002	0.64	
Niche Party	0.27	0.45	0	1	0
Majority Government	0.57	0.49	0	1	1
Ideological Complexity	4.45	6.43	0	49.45	
Government Tenure	5.34	4.43	0	20	
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	2.46	2.43	-4.27	16.67	
Time Left in CIEP	10.93	4.83	0	20	
Number of Previous NCMs	0.64	1.20	0	6	
Time Since Previous NCM	55.74	52.81	0	224	

Table S.2: Distribution of No-Confidence Motions across Government and Opposition Partisanship

		Government		
		<i>Partisanship</i> < 0	<i>Partisanship</i> > 0	<b>Total</b>
Opposition	Left	9	41	50
	Center/Right	38	15	53
<b>Total</b>		47	56	103

Table S.3: Partisanship, Disputes (All Hostility Levels), and No-Confidence Motions

	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 6</b>
All MIDs	0.23*	0.16	-0.18
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.22)
Left Party			-0.28
			(0.30)
Government Partisanship			0.002
			(0.01)
Partisanship		0.009	
		(0.006)	
MIDs×Partisanship		0.009*	
		(0.005)	
Left×MIDs			0.14
			(0.40)
MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			-0.04**
			(0.01)
Left×Gov't Partisanship			0.026**
			(0.01)
Left×MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			0.026
			(0.019)
Party Size	5.82***	6.06***	5.65***
	(0.85)	(0.87)	(0.78)
Niche Party	0.14	0.31	0.30
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.37)
Majority Government	-0.60*	-0.61*	-0.60*
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.34)
Ideological Complexity	-0.007	-0.005	-0.011
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Government Tenure	-0.004	0.001	-0.006
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Time Left in CIEP	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Number of Previous NCMs	0.008	0.01	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Time Since Previous NCM	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	-5.03***	-5.11***	-5.07***
	(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.55)
Observations	30	8,005	8,005
Pseudo $R^2$		0.09	0.11

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table S.4: Partisanship, Fatal Disputes, and No-Confidence Motions

	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>
Fatal MIDs	0.250 (0.701)	-2.328*** (0.574)	0.003 (0.691)
Partisanship		0.010** (0.005)	
Government Partisanship			0.011 (0.007)
MIDs×Partisanship		0.113*** (0.022)	
MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			-0.023 (0.016)
Party Size	5.776*** (0.868)	6.089*** (0.932)	5.642*** (0.873)
Niche Party	0.142 (0.300)	0.295 (0.320)	0.124 (0.302)
Majority Government	-0.584 (0.367)	-0.588 (0.368)	-0.620* (0.347)
Ideological Complexity	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.026)
Government Tenure	-0.002 (0.051)	0.0002 (0.050)	-0.003 (0.051)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.058 (0.064)	-0.051 (0.065)	-0.046 (0.066)
Time Left in CIEP	0.037 (0.035)	0.036 (0.034)	0.039 (0.034)
Number of Previous NCMs	0.021 (0.080)	0.007 (0.085)	0.031 (0.083)
Time Since Previous NCM	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
Constant	-4.973*** (0.547)	-5.059*** (0.508)	-5.027*** (0.540)
Observations	8005	8005	8005
Pseudo $R^2$	0.09	0.10	0.09

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table S.5: Partisanship, Disputes, and No-Confidence Motions: Controlling for Dispute Duration

	<b>Model 10</b>	<b>Model 11</b>	<b>Model 12</b>
Hostile MIDs	0.075 (0.277)	-0.084 (0.333)	-0.586* (0.326)
Left Party			-0.220 (0.312)
Government Partisanship			0.0001 (0.011)
Partisanship		0.008 (0.006)	
MIDs×Partisanship		0.013** (0.006)	
Left×MIDs			-0.982* (0.552)
MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			-0.043** (0.017)
Left×Gov't Partisanship			0.024* (0.013)
Left×MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			0.079*** (0.021)
Dispute Duration	0.032 (0.044)	0.043 (0.041)	0.066 (0.048)
Party Size	5.834*** (0.862)	6.051*** (0.883)	5.644*** (0.802)
Niche Party	0.142 (0.305)	0.309 (0.311)	0.311 (0.355)
Majority Government	-0.593 (0.375)	-0.605 (0.375)	-0.569 (0.353)
Ideological Complexity	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.028)
Government Tenure	-0.004 (0.051)	0.002 (0.050)	-0.009 (0.051)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.051 (0.065)	-0.047 (0.065)	-0.040 (0.061)
Time Left in CIEP	0.036 (0.036)	0.034 (0.034)	0.038 (0.036)
Number of Previous NCMs	0.013 (0.078)	0.017 (0.081)	-0.005 (0.091)
Time Since Previous NCM	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)
Constant	<sup>32</sup> -5.006*** (0.564)	-5.081*** (0.535)	-5.059*** (0.563)
Observations	8005	8005	8005
Pseudo $R^2$	0.09	0.10	0.11

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table S.6: Partisanship, Hostile Disputes, and No-Confidence Motions: Relative Belligerence

	<b>Model 13</b>	<b>Model 14</b>
	<b>Right/Center Opp.</b>	<b>Left Opp.</b>
Hostile MIDs	0.237 (0.458)	-0.862 (0.596)
Timid	0.426 (0.720)	-3.700*** (1.066)
Government Partisanship	0.006 (0.011)	0.024** (0.010)
Timid×MIDs	-4.500*** (1.368)	1.952*** (0.645)
MIDs×Gov't Partisanship	-0.016 (0.021)	0.027 (0.018)
Timid×Gov't Partisanship	-0.039* (0.021)	0.079*** (0.027)
Timid×MIDs×Gov't Partisanship	-0.143** (0.057)	-0.043* (0.025)
Party Size	7.269*** (1.018)	4.457*** (1.301)
Niche Party	1.594*** (0.524)	-0.256 (0.395)
Majority Government	-0.990*** (0.344)	-0.324 (0.309)
Ideological Complexity	-0.060* (0.035)	0.006 (0.023)
Government Tenure	0.058 (0.041)	-0.091** (0.042)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.079 (0.065)	-0.023 (0.050)
Time Left in CIEP	-0.010 (0.035)	0.085*** (0.029)
Number of Previous NCMs	-0.002 (0.118)	-0.036 (0.093)
Time Since Previous NCM	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)
Constant	-5.137*** (0.584)	-5.240*** (0.744)
Observations	4437	3568
Pseudo $R^2$	0.15	0.12

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table S.7: Electoral Consequences of Hostile Disputes and No-Confidence Motions

	<b>Model 15</b>	<b>Model 16</b>
	<b>Government</b>	<b>Opposition</b>
	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Parties</b>
Security NCMs	-4.766*** (0.954)	1.041*** (0.168)
Government Partisanship	-0.008 (0.008)	0.005 (0.006)
Left		-0.057 (0.240)
Left×Gov't Partisanship		0.011 (0.014)
Left×Security NCMs		-1.787*** (0.234)
Security NCMs×Gov't Partisanship	0.154*** (0.022)	-0.081*** (0.007)
Security NCMs×Gov't Partisanship×Left		0.067*** (0.014)
Hostile MIDs	-0.950 (0.784)	0.139 (0.332)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	0.128** (0.053)	-0.082* (0.051)
Prime Minister	1.357* (0.718)	()
Time Left in CIEP	0.795 (1.310)	()
PM×CIEP	4.339** (2.042)	()
Vote Share <sub>t</sub>	-0.124*** (0.022)	0.018 (0.014)
Constant	0.096 (0.448)	
Observations	478	780
Adjusted $R^2$	0.14	0.01

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table S.8: Partisanship, Hostile Disputes, and No-Confidence Motions: Excluding France

	<b>Model 17</b>	<b>Model 18</b>	<b>Model 19</b>
Hostile MIDs	0.277 (0.186)	0.189 (0.204)	-0.297 (0.411)
Left Party			-0.261 (0.368)
Government Partisanship			0.007 (0.010)
Partisanship		0.011* (0.006)	
MIDs×Partisanship		0.010** (0.005)	
Left×MIDs			-0.588* (0.340)
MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			-0.044** (0.022)
Left×Gov't Partisanship			0.017 (0.012)
Left×MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			0.073*** (0.025)
Party Size	5.782*** (0.964)	6.059*** (0.977)	5.627*** (0.946)
Niche Party	0.251 (0.339)	0.449 (0.349)	0.424 (0.406)
Majority Government	-0.542 (0.429)	-0.576 (0.431)	-0.535 (0.398)
Ideological Complexity	-0.020 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.029)
Government Tenure	0.012 (0.054)	0.019 (0.053)	0.009 (0.053)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.046 (0.071)	-0.041 (0.070)	-0.034 (0.066)
Time Left in CIEP	0.037 (0.041)	0.035 (0.039)	0.039 (0.041)
Number of Previous NCMs	-0.014 (0.086)	-0.022 (0.081)	-0.037 (0.095)
Time Since Previous NCM	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
Constant	-5.203*** (0.591)	-5.270*** (0.557)	-5.195*** (0.572)
Observations	35 7475	7475	7475
Pseudo $R^2$	0.09	0.09	0.10

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table S.9: Partisanship, Initiated Hostile Disputes, and No-Confidence Motions

	<b>Model 20</b>	<b>Model 21</b>	<b>Model 22</b>
Hostile MIDs	0.133 (0.315)	0.092 (0.268)	-0.024 (0.292)
Left Party			-0.330 (0.340)
Government Partisanship			-0.006 (0.010)
Partisanship		0.009* (0.005)	
MIDs×Partisanship		0.023** (0.011)	
Left×MIDs			-0.464 (0.727)
MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			-0.016 (0.015)
Left×Gov't Partisanship			0.031*** (0.012)
Left×MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			0.035** (0.017)
Party Size	5.812*** (0.871)	6.052*** (0.895)	5.820*** (0.808)
Niche Party	0.141 (0.301)	0.304 (0.311)	0.338 (0.353)
Majority Government	-0.583 (0.374)	-0.601 (0.373)	-0.552 (0.363)
Ideological Complexity	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.029)
Government Tenure	-0.003 (0.051)	0.004 (0.051)	-0.009 (0.051)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.056 (0.064)	-0.051 (0.066)	-0.048 (0.062)
Time Left in CIEP	0.036 (0.035)	0.033 (0.034)	0.035 (0.036)
Number of Previous NCMs	0.018 (0.080)	0.016 (0.081)	-0.015 (0.090)
Time Since Previous NCM	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
Constant	-4.978*** (0.538)	-5.053*** (0.507)	-4.981*** (0.564)
Observations	36 8005	8005	8005
Pseudo $R^2$	0.09	0.10	0.10

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table S.10: Partisanship, Targeted Hostile Disputes, and No-Confidence Motions

	<b>Model 23</b>	<b>Model 24</b>	<b>Model 25</b>
Hostile MIDs	0.284 (0.347)	0.203 (0.407)	-0.649 (0.575)
Left Party			-0.243 (0.307)
Government Partisanship			-0.003 (0.011)
Partisanship		0.011** (0.005)	
MIDs×Partisanship		0.005 (0.009)	
Left×MIDs			-4.033** (1.804)
MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			-0.060** (0.030)
Left×Gov't Partisanship			0.028*** (0.011)
Left×MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			0.185*** (0.070)
Party Size	5.760*** (0.883)	6.026*** (0.920)	5.700*** (0.813)
Niche Party	0.143 (0.301)	0.317 (0.313)	0.292 (0.356)
Majority Government	-0.582 (0.363)	-0.585 (0.365)	-0.634* (0.356)
Ideological Complexity	-0.007 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.028)
Government Tenure	-0.002 (0.052)	-0.0004 (0.050)	-0.007 (0.050)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.053 (0.065)	-0.050 (0.065)	-0.041 (0.061)
Time Left in CIEP	0.038 (0.036)	0.036 (0.035)	0.037 (0.037)
Number of Previous NCMs	0.020 (0.080)	0.021 (0.082)	-0.004 (0.100)
Time Since Previous NCM	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)
Constant	-5.014*** (0.584)	-5.085*** (0.548)	-5.017*** (0.584)
Observations	37 8005	8005	8005
Pseudo $R^2$	0.09	0.10	0.11

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table S.11: Partisanship, Hostile Disputes, and No-Confidence Motions: Cold War

	<b>Model 26</b>	<b>Model 27</b>	<b>Model 28</b>
Hostile MIDs	0.086 (0.432)	0.058 (0.426)	-1.177 (0.938)
Left Party			0.009 (0.243)
Government Partisanship			-0.004 (0.013)
Partisanship		0.006 (0.008)	
MIDs×Partisanship		0.004 (0.011)	
Left×MIDs			-1.166 (1.186)
MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			-0.079** (0.031)
Left×Gov't Partisanship			0.039** (0.014)
Left×MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			0.0107*** (0.037)
Party Size	6.189*** (1.178)	6.280*** (1.231)	6.460*** (1.006)
Niche Party	0.170 (0.194)	0.267 (0.222)	0.244 (0.209)
Majority Government	-0.689*** (0.406)	-0.693* (0.411)	-0.850** (0.385)
Ideological Complexity	-0.017 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.035)
Government Tenure	0.009 (0.074)	0.010 (0.074)	0.009 (0.078)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.044 (0.074)	-0.041 (0.074)	-0.040 (0.066)
Time Left in CIEP	0.052 (0.050)	0.050 (0.050)	0.055 (0.054)
Number of Previous NCMs	0.012 (0.122)	0.019 (0.127)	-0.062 (0.126)
Time Since Previous NCM	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)
Constant	-5.177*** (0.879)	-5.202*** (0.876)	-5.375*** (0.936)
Observations	38 4661	4661	4661
Pseudo $R^2$	0.11	0.11	0.14

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

Table S.12: Partisanship, Hostile Disputes, and No-Confidence Motions: Post-Cold War

	<b>Model 29</b>	<b>Model 30</b>	<b>Model 31</b>
Hostile MIDs	0.521*	0.339	0.041
	(0.272)	(0.298)	(0.344)
Left Party			-0.569
			(0.572)
Government Partisanship			0.002
			(0.021)
Partisanship		0.012**	
		(0.005)	
MIDs×Partisanship		0.016***	
		(0.006)	
Left×MIDs			-1.006
			(1.054)
MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			-0.025
			(0.021)
Left×Gov't Partisanship			-0.037
			(0.028)
Left×MIDs×Gov't Partisanship			0.129***
			(0.047)
Party Size	4.219***	4.472***	4.493**
	(1.423)	(1.498)	(1.791)
Niche Party	-0.017	0.258	0.370
	(0.491)	(0.504)	(0.482)
Majority Government	-0.790	-0.798	-0.650
	(0.680)	(0.642)	(0.729)
Ideological Complexity	0.030	0.021	0.029
	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.057)
Government Tenure	-0.006	0.012	-0.008
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Real GDP Per Capita Growth	-0.046	-0.048	-0.065
	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.064)
Time Left in CIEP	0.003	0.006	0.007
	(0.063)	(0.053)	(0.062)
Number of Previous NCMs	0.104	0.094	0.090
	(0.147)	(0.142)	(0.134)
Time Since Previous NCM	-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.006*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	-4.765***	-4.922***	-4.656***
	(1.097)	(0.954)	(1.016)
Observations	39 3344	3344	3344
Pseudo $R^2$	0.07	0.09	0.09

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10