Estimating the Defense Spending Vote

Additional Materials

Overview

In this document I providef additional models and figures demonstrating the substantive effects of *income quartiles*, the estimated relationships for the macro-analysis and the model fit for international hostilities.

Income Quartiles

To demonstrate the magnitude of the substantive effects of defense spending, I also generate the survey-specific change in party support for a substantial shift in the *income quartiles* variable from 1 (the lowest quartile) to 4 (the highest quartile). These survey-specific estimates are shown in Figure S.1. Even though income taps into multiple dimensions (such as class, education, economic redistribution, etc), it influences party support to a lesser extent (it ranges from -0.29 to 0.30 with a standard deviation of 0.09) and in fewer cases than defense spending preferences (statistically significant at the 90% level for only 20.2% of the parties).

Model Fit in Meta-Analysis

In the manuscript I show a series of figures that demonstrate the macro-relationship between party-specific ideology and the defense spending vote. In each figure, I show a regression line (and 90% confidence intervals) weighted by the inverse of the standard errors. Table S.1 provides the full sets of regression results.

Hostile MIDs

In the manuscript I argue that the best timeframe for counting the number of hostile disputes prior to the survey is 36 months prior. I base that inference off of a series of additional OLS regressions

Figure S.1: Income Quartile Vote for Each Party in the Sample



Note: Estimates of the change in predicted probabilty of voting for each party (and 90% confidence intervals), derived from the survey-specific models. The income quartile vote represents the change in the probability of voting for party j, given a shift from the lowest to highest income quartile. This effect is averaged over the entire sample of respondents for each survey.

Table S.1: Macro-Analysis of the Determinants of the Defense Spending Vote

	Ideology All	**Emphasis All**	**Ideology No Disputes**	**Ideology Disputes**	**Emphasis No Disputes**	**Emphasis Disputes**
Gov't Ideology	0.002***		0.002***	0.004***		
	(0.0004)		(0.0004)	(0.002)		
Emphasis		0.015***			0.013***	0.03***
		(0.004)			(0.004)	(0.005)
Constant	-0.003	-0.008	-0.004	0.0001	-0.006	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.03)	(0.009)	(0.03)
N	208	208	166	42	166	42
Adjusted R^2	0.22	0.15	0.19	0.35	0.14	0.22
RMSE	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.13	0.09	0.14

Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1 (two-tailed).
Standard errors in parentheses.

based on the interactive relationship between the count of disputes and partisanship. In Table S.2 I show the OLS regression results for five different count variables of hostile disputes: 6-, 12-, 18-, 24- and 36-months prior to the survey.

In each of the models (except for the 6-month variable), the interaction between *hostile disputes* and *ideology* is statistically significant (at the 90% confidence level or higher) and positive. This implies that the effects of *hostile disputes* increases the farther to the right the party's *ideology* is. When we compare the R^2 and root mean squared error (RMSE) across models, we can see that the 36-month variable provides the best fitting model. Thus, I select this timeframe for the *hostile disputes* variable in the manuscript.

Table S.2: Assessing the Effects of Different Timeframes of International Disputes on the Defense Spending Vote

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**
Government Ideology	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Hostile MIDs (6 months prior)	-0.007				
	(0.04)				
Hostile MIDs (12 months prior)		-0.03			
		(0.04)			
Hostile MIDs (18 months prior)			-0.03		
			(0.03)		
Hostile MIDs (24 months prior)				-0.02	
				(0.02)	
Hostile MIDs (36 months prior)					-0.02
					(0.02)
Ideology×Hostile MIDs (6)	0.002*				
	(0.001)				
Ideology×Hostile MIDs (12)		0.002*			
		(0.001)			
Ideology×Hostile MIDs (18)			0.002**		
			(0.0008)		
Ideology×Hostile MIDs (24)				0.001*	
				(0.0007)	
Ideology×Hostile MIDs (36)					0.001**
					(0.0005)
Constant	-0.003	-0.001	-0.00004	-0.0001	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
N	208	208	208	208	208
R^2	0.24	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.29
RMSE	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.09

Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1 (two-tailed).
Standard errors in parentheses.